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Uganda, the first state to refer a situation to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC),1 came to exemplify the peace versus justice debate. The Ugandan conflict 
with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) raised questions over whether there 
must be a choice between successful peace negotiations and prosecution at the 
ICC.2 I previously explored the peace versus justice debate in Uganda, which can 
also be recharacterized as a debate over what sort of justice, broadly speaking: 
Western, retributive justice based on prosecution and incarceration, or traditional, 
restorative justice based on tribal ceremonies and reconciliation.3 
Using Uganda as an example, I proposed an approach to harmonize these 
conceptions of justice in the context of ICC deferrals to traditional justice 
mechanisms. This symposium, honoring the work of international criminal 
 
* Vice Dean, Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; JD Yale Law School 1996. 
This article is based on a presentation given at the 2016 Global Center Annual Symposium, Crimes without 
Borders: In Search of an International Justice System, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law 
(March 4, 2016). The author would like to thank Professor Linda Carter and all the organizers and participants 
in the symposium. 
1. Situation in Uganda, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan 
Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 211 (2008). 
3. Id. 
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justice scholar Linda Carter, offers an opportunity to revisit these issues. I will 
briefly summarize the Uganda / ICC relationship and the Ugandan / LRA 
conflict. I will then recap the ways in which the ICC might defer to Ugandan 
proceedings. Next, I will condense my proposal for looking to the goals of 
international criminal justice to determine whether the ICC should defer to 
Ugandan proceedings such as the traditional justice of mato oput. Finally, I will 
bring us up to date with the current controversies related to prosecuting the LRA 
in two ways: first, by looking at the ICC case against Dominic Ongwen, the only 
alleged LRA commander in ICC custody; and second, by reviewing the bumpy 
road to domestic prosecution of alleged LRA leader Thomas Kwoyelo in light of 
Uganda’s Amnesty Act. 
I conclude that more recent events do not offer much insight on whether 
domestic prosecution or traditional alternatives further the goals of international 
criminal justice. By contrast, it seems that neither the ICC nor Uganda has faced 
the hard questions. Rather than requesting Ongwen be prosecuted in Uganda, it 
seems that Uganda found it more convenient, for resource and political reasons, 
to leave Ongwen’s controversial prosecution to the ICC. Rather than using the 
Kwoyelo case as an opportunity to establish a coherent policy on amnesty or 
other non-prosecutorial alternatives, it seems making an example of Kwoyelo 
was politically expedient at the time. Although the prosecution of Kwoyelo could 
be the harbinger of a push for prosecutorial accountability for LRA in Uganda, 
the far more numerous examples of LRA members receiving amnesty call this 
into question. Given the difficulties encountered to date in prosecuting Kwoyelo 
before domestic courts, it seems unlikely the Ugandan government will be eager 
to withhold amnesty from others. A successful conclusion to the Kwoyelo 
prosecution, however, may lead to the opposite reaction. At the time of the 
writing of this article, the Kwoyelo case had not yet gone to trial. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ICC & UGANDA CASES 
The ICC was established by treaty, known as the Rome Statute.4 Its 
jurisdiction includes genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (and 
possibly crimes of aggression).5 It is a court of “complementary” jurisdiction6—
intended to supplement, not supplant, state prosecutions.7 Under the principle of 
complementarity, the ICC only steps in where the state is not acting, or is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute those most responsible 
for international crimes.8 
 
4. Id. at 215. 
5. Id. at 215–16. 
6. Id. at 252. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 215–16. 
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In the case of Uganda, the government asked the ICC to investigate LRA 
atrocities.9 The LRA is led by Joseph Kony, who became world-famous due to 
the viral video Kony 2012.10 The conflict between the government and the LRA 
has raged with varying intensity for years, punctuated by failed peace 
initiatives.11 Hundreds of thousands have been displaced by the conflict, and 
civilians targeted in raids on villages and internally displaced persons camps.12 
The LRA has committed numerous atrocities, but it is perhaps best known for 
kidnapping children and forcing them to become LRA fighters or sex slaves.13 
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) opened an investigation into crimes 
of the LRA (and supposedly all parties to the conflict), a step that is credited by 
some with bringing the LRA to the negotiating table.14 ICC arrest warrants, 
unsealed in October 2005, charge war crimes and crimes against humanity 
against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and 
Dominic Ongwen.15 The cases against Odhiambo and Lukwiya were terminated 
after their deaths were confirmed by the ICC.16 Otti has reportedly been killed on 
Kony’s orders.17 As discussed below, Ongwen is at the ICC awaiting trial.18 
The most serious peace negotiations to date took place in Juba in 2006–
2008.19 Though various agreements were drafted, the final deal offered a blend of 
prosecutorial and transitional justice mechanisms, leaving unclear whether Kony 
was being offered promises of non-prosecution.20 Regardless, Kony refused to 
sign the agreement and resumed hostilities in other parts of Africa.21 
 
9. Id. at 215. 
10. Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Viral Video, Vicious Warlord, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A35. 
11. Keller, supra note 2, at 214–15. 
12. Id. at 214. 
13. Id. at 213. The LRA’s notoriety for certain crimes, such as abductions, may be overstated in some 
sources but nonetheless reflects serious international crimes. See THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND 
REALITY 133 (Tim Allen & Koen Vlassenroot, eds., 2010) (discussing perceived versus actual abductions by 
LRA). 
14. Id. at 216. 
15. Id. at 217. 
16. Kony et al. Case, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 (July 8, 2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/ 
Pages/default.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
17. Noel Mwakugu, Obituary: LRA Deputy Vincent Otti, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2008, 14:16 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7083311.stm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); THE 
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at 18. 
18. The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15 (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/uganda/ongwen/Documents/OngwenEng.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
19. THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at 17. 
20. Keller, supra note 2, at 209, 218–22. 
21. Paul Ronan & Lisa Dougan, Joseph Kony’s LRA Is Still Abducting Children, Even After CAR Votes 
for Peace, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2016, 6:02 AM), available at http://www.newsweek.com/joseph-kony-lords-
resistance-army-child-soldiers-433360 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also LRA 
CRISIS TRACKER REPORTS, https://reports.lracrisistracker.com/ (last visited June 25, 2016) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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The LRA initially demanded that the ICC warrants be withdrawn as a 
condition of any agreement,22 setting up a conflict between peace and justice.23 I 
believe that the peace versus justice dilemma sets up a false dichotomy. I am not 
the first to take this position. Others also say that it is possible to have both peace 
and justice.24 The trick is to figure out how to do so. The ICC should not rigidly 
require ICC prosecutions in all circumstances. It should defer to states to come 
up with alternatives to ICC prosecution when necessary to achieve both peace 
and some measure of justice. 
II. POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR ICC DEFERRAL 
Assuming that Kony is genuinely willing to make peace—a big and rather 
dubious assumption—how can the ICC promote both peace and justice? The ICC 
can defer to state prosecutions under the Rome Statute, so the ICC could 
potentially defer to Uganda if Kony and Uganda agree that Kony will be 
prosecuted at the state level, so long as that prosecution is not a sham trial.25 But 
what if Kony holds out for something other than prosecution and punishment, 
such as a traditional alternative called mato oput? The ICC might be able to defer 
to this traditional justice mechanism, but such a finding might stretch the Rome 
Statute beyond what some consider its plausible interpretation.26 More 
significantly, the ICC should not take such a step unless it also furthers the 
apparent goals of international criminal justice. 
I should mention some caveats here based on the confusing facts on the 
ground. I will focus on Kony’s demand for the nonprosecutorial alternative of 
mato oput, as that has been his most consistent position.27 Uganda’s position, 
however, is less clear.28 President Museveni has, at times, indicated that 
traditional justice like mato oput would be offered as part of the peace deal.29 The 
 
22. Keller, supra note 2, at 211. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at Part III.D. 
26. Other scholars have written about the potential ways the ICC might defer to states. For example, in 
their forthcoming book, Professors Linda Carter and Charles Jalloh provide insightful analysis of nonjudicial 
proceedings in the ICC context, focusing on Articles 17, 21, and 53. They recommend an expert panel to 
examine the legal and policy issues regarding the status of nonjudicial alternatives under the Rome Statute 
given the uncertainty of the statutory language. Linda E. Carter & Charles Chernor Jaolloh, The Relationship of 
International Criminal Courts with National Nonjudicial Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT IN AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (forthcoming 2016) (Chapter 4 on file with author). 
27. Keller, supra note 2, at 218–21; see THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra 
note 13, at 258 for a discussion on how LRA adopted Acholi justice at Juba negotiations despite confusion over 
application to Kony. The account in this source indicates that Kony also looked to the example of South Sudan 
in seeking both money and a position in the government. Id. at 184. 
28. Keller, supra note 2, at 220. 
29. Id. 
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peace deal itself refers to mato oput and other traditional justice mechanisms.30 It 
refers to a truth forum, which seems to be a Ugandan truth commission.31 But it 
also refers to state prosecution, albeit with some confusing references to 
alternative penalties.32 It seems less likely that Kony would agree to state, but not 
ICC, prosecution as part of the peace deal. As a result, I am going to focus on just 
one type of non-prosecutorial alternative here: mato oput.33 
Mato oput is described as a traditional reconciliation process of the Acholi 
tribe of Northern Uganda.34 Kony is Acholi, as are many of his fighters and his 
victims.35 Traditionally, the mato oput ceremony was used to resolve conflicts 
among clans.36 It is sometimes known as “drinking the bitter root” because the 
ceremony includes members of opposing parties drinking a bitter drink 
together.37 But mato oput can be far more than that. It can be a complex conflict 
resolution process involving fact-finding, mediation, admission of guilt, and 
compensation. It is aimed at reintegrating the offender into the community, not as 
much on punishing him.38 
The Rome Statute sets up several ways in which the ICC could defer to state 
action.39 The provisions, however, are rather vague about what constitutes a valid 
state prosecution. 
It gets even more complicated when it comes to nonprosecutorial 
alternatives, such as mato oput, or other alternatives like truth commissions or 
amnesties. It is not at all clear how the provisions would work when faced with a 
state that wants to assert jurisdiction based on nonprosecutorial mechanisms.40 
First, under Article 16, the ICC could follow a request from the UN Security 
Council to suspend the investigation or prosecution.41 Under the Rome Statute, 
the Security Council has the power to make the political determination that the 
ICC investigation or prosecution is a threat to international peace and security.42 
If Kony signs a peace deal and disarms, Uganda could ask the Security Council 
to make an Article 16 deferral.43 This method’s drawback is that it is only a 
 
30. Id. at 223. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 218. 
34. See THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at Chapter 13 for a 
discussion of the authenticity of the concept of mato oput and other so-called traditional methods as used by 
various actors in the context of Northern Uganda. 
35. Keller, supra note 2, at 224, 230. 
36. Id. at 230. 
37. Id. 
38. See id. at Part II, for an extensive discussion of mato oput, including challenges in discerning support 
for it and in using a traditional justice mechanism like mato oput in the context of ICC crimes. 
39. Id. at 237. 
40. Id. at 237–39. 
41. Id. at 238. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 238–39. 
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temporary measure, for one year, albeit renewable.44 It is not clear that this would 
satisfy Kony. Moreover, the trend is shifting away from amnesty and toward 
accountability. Nonetheless, it is possible the Security Council could step in to 
halt the ICC prosecution against Kony in the interests of peace.45 
Second, the ICC could determine that mato oput constitutes a prior 
proceeding that would block an accused from being tried a second time under 
Article 20.46 Given that it is difficult to put a non-prosecutorial mechanism in the 
same class as trial before another court, it is unlikely mato oput would fall under 
Article 20. 
Third, the ICC could determine that the case against Kony is inadmissible. 
Under Article 17, a case is inadmissible if: 
1. the case is being or has been investigated or prosecuted by a State 
with jurisdiction, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
do so; 
2.  the case is barred because the person has already been prosecuted by 
another court; 
3. the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify prosecution.47 
With regard to state investigation or prosecution, it is not clear that this 
would apply to a traditional justice mechanism like mato oput. Similarly, it is not 
clear that undergoing mato oput could constitute a prior prosecution—one that 
would bar the ICC from going forward—because it is not a trial by a court. 
Finally, it is unlikely that the ICC would determine that the LRA’s crimes are not 
sufficiently grave given the facts.48 
Thus, a close reading of Article 17 shows it is unlikely that mato oput would 
render the case against Kony inadmissible.49 But there is enough ambiguity in the 
language that the ICC could stretch the provision to cover traditional justice such 
as mato oput, especially if paired with a truth commission.50 
A fourth statutory provision is Article 53, which deals with prosecutorial 
discretion.51 The Prosecutor could decline to prosecute if it is not in the interests 
 
44. Id. at 239. 
45. Id. at Part III.A. 
46. Id. at 245. 
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 12–13 (July 1, 2002), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
48. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.D. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at Part III.D. 
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 47, at 33. 
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of justice.52 Specifically, the statute provides that the Prosecutor can determine 
there is no basis for prosecution because it “is not in the interests of justice, 
taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the 
interests of the victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his 
or her role in the alleged crime.”53 
Again, the language is vague enough that it might encompass mato oput. In 
other words, the Prosecutor could decide that it is in the interests of justice to 
allow Uganda to reach a compromise with Kony that would end the conflict, 
even if that means promising Kony that he would not be prosecuted. This is 
particularly true if the victims strongly support it.54 
In fact, this is the argument that some members of the Acholi tribe made to 
the then-Prosecutor before he sought the arrest warrants.55 The argument was 
obviously unpersuasive. The then-Prosecutor implied that he saw Kony’s 
demands as extortion and blackmail—demands that must be rejected.56 
Nonetheless, if Kony were to sign the deal and go through the mato oput process, 
perhaps the current Prosecutor could reconsider and suspend the prosecution 
based on the new facts on the ground.57 
III. FURTHERING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Assuming the procedural avenue exists, should the ICC defer to traditional 
justice under any circumstances? One could take a hardline retributive justice 
position and conclude that the ICC can never defer to a traditional justice 
mechanism like mato oput. Anything short of prosecution in a court may be seen 
as insufficient. If the ICC is supposed to end impunity, then one could argue that 
deferral to traditional justice mechanisms like mato oput violates the object and 
purpose of the Rome Statute.58 At the other extreme, one could say the ICC 
should defer to anything that a society deems necessary to achieve peace, short of 
a self-serving amnesty. I suggest that the ICC should find a principled middle 
ground. It should defer to alternative mechanisms when it is necessary for peace 
and when it can achieve some measure of justice.59 
 
52. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.C. 
53. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 47, at 33. 
54. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.C. 
55. Id. at 250. 
56. Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Address at Nuremberg: Building a 
Future on Peace and Justice (June 24, 2007), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-
2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). In 2007, then-Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated, “Allowed to remain at 
large, the criminals ask for immunity under one form or another as a condition to stopping the violence. They 
threaten to attack more victims. I call this extortion, I call it blackmail. We cannot yield.” 
57. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.C. 
58. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 47. 
59. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.D. 
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To determine necessity, the ICC would look at whether the alternative is 
truly needed to achieve peace. If Kony maintains his insistence on 
nonprosecutorial alternatives and continues to commit atrocities, then alternative 
measures like mato oput might be a last resort supported by most victims.60 
To determine whether traditional mechanisms achieve some measure of 
justice, the ICC should look to the goals of the ICC.61 Although ICC goals are 
contested, there is general agreement that the ICC is meant to further retribution, 
deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice.62 If traditional justice like mato 
oput can further these goals to the same extent as ICC prosecution, the ICC 
should defer.63 At first glance, ICC prosecution appears superior to mato oput in 
achieving these four goals of international criminal justice, but there is more than 
meets the eye. 
A. Retribution 
Retribution typically justifies prosecution and punishment based on 
individual culpability: a person is prosecuted and punished because he deserves 
it. Retribution is generally linked to criminal prosecution, but its concern with 
individual culpability and punishment might be furthered by mato oput to some 
extent.64 
The process of mato oput requires an investigation and establishment of 
individual responsibility.65 Because it requires the offender to admit guilt and 
express remorse, it might be similar to prosecution in terms of culpability—
particularly if Kony were to deny responsibility at trial.66 
Mato oput might also impose punishment, albeit of a different sort. Rather 
than incarceration, the punishment takes the form of compensation and 
shaming.67 To Western retributivists, this punishment is clearly insufficient 
compared to the thirty years or life imprisonment Kony might face at the ICC. 
But from the perspective of the victims, there is less enthusiasm at the idea of 
Kony spending the rest of his days in a distant, internationally-approved prison, 
with ample food and medical care. One Acholi leader, for example, has noted 
 
60. See id. at Part IV.B. (observing the strength of support for non-prosecutorial alternatives is difficult to 
measure and often dependent on context, as one strong proponent of mato oput for the LRA, David Acana 
(Acholi paramount chief) subsequently expressed support for the prosecution of LRA leaders in 2008); see also 
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at 260–61 (explaining this could have 
been influenced by the failure of the peace process as well as the LRA’s departure from Northern Uganda, 
allowing for a more peaceful life for the community). 
61. See generally Keller, supra note 2, at 213. 
62. See generally id. 
63. Id. at 265. 
64. Id. at Part IV.C.1. 
65. Id. at 229. 
66. Id. at 267, 269. 
67. Id. at 229 
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that Kony should be in the community among those who had suffered, not in an 
air-conditioned prison.68 The local shaming component of mato oput might be 
seen as greater punishment within the victim community.69 
Thus, mato oput might further retributive justice in the eyes of many of the 
victims, although it seems that ICC prosecution would still do so to a greater 
extent. 
B. Deterrence 
There is a good argument that mato oput will not deter Kony from re-
offending, nor will it deter would-be rebels from committing crimes. Deterrence 
is premised on a rational actor model.70 Those who commit atrocities are unlikely 
to refrain from doing so for fear of facing mato oput in the future. But the same 
can be said for ICC prosecution.71 
Moreover, mato oput is likely to reach far more offenders than ICC 
prosecution, which focuses on those most responsible.72 Mato oput also 
reintegrates offenders into the community.73 Thus, on broad preventive grounds, 
mato oput might be more effective, especially if combined with other steps 
toward reconciliation like a truth commission. Overall, while mato oput is 
unlikely to further deterrence, it likely matches the ICC’s inability to effectively 
deter most offenders.74 
C. Expressivism 
Expressivism, in short, is the idea that the role of the criminal justice system 
is to send a message to society.75 The treatment of offenders is supposed to send 
a message of condemnation of the act in order to inculcate moral values in 
society.76 Mato oput clearly censures the actions of the offender, and its message 
is likely effectively communicated on the local level.77 Mato oput might be 
particularly powerful because the accused is required to accept responsibility for 
the crime, effectively embracing the denunciation inherent in the process.78 A 
powerless Kony, admitting guilt and drinking the bitter root in an expression of 
 
68. TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE 
ARMY 135 (2006). 
69. Keller, supra note 2, at 268. 
70. Id. at 272. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 271. 
73. Id. at 277. 
74. Id. at 273. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 274. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 275. 
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remorse and reconciliation, might send a compelling message.79 By contrast, the 
expressivist message from Kony’s ICC prosecution might be muffled by a long, 
distant criminal trial presumably followed by incarceration in a cushy prison cell. 
Thus, mato oput might advance expressivism to the same, if not a greater, extent 
as ICC prosecution.80 
D. Restorative Justice 
Similarly, mato oput might further restorative justice to the same, if not 
greater, magnitude as ICC prosecution.81 Restorative justice is focused on 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, reintegration of former 
offenders, and restoration of bonds within broader society.82 The mato oput 
ceremony is squarely aimed at achieving these goals. It reintegrates the offender 
by requiring acknowledgment and compensation on the part of the perpetrator.83 
It directly involves the victim reconciling with the perpetrator.84 If paired with 
other restorative justice mechanisms like a truth commission, it would also 
explore the root causes of the conflict and address the North-South divide in 
Uganda.85 Although the ICC allows victim participation to a greater extent than 
prior tribunals, it is not as well-suited to addressing reconciliation or reintegration 
within the society.86 
In summary, my prior analysis of mato oput and the four goals of 
international criminal justice yielded the following tentative conclusions. Mato 
oput would be less effective, or similarly inept, at achieving retribution and 
deterrence. Yet, it would likely be more effective than ICC prosecution at 
furthering expressivism and restorative justice. Overall, mato oput could achieve 
enough “justice” that the ICC should defer where necessary to achieve peace 
even though traditional justice does not mimic ICC prosecution and 
punishment.87 
IV. RECENT EVENTS 
This theoretical approach to ICC deferral could be implemented by the ICC 
if Uganda asked the ICC to defer to its domestic proceedings, whether mato oput 
 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 275–76. 
83. Id. at 277. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at Part IV.C.4. 
87. Id. 
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or otherwise. Kony, however, is still at large.88 Dominic Ongwen, on the other 
hand, is no longer in hiding.89 His surrender or capture could have led the ICC 
and Uganda to face the question of prosecution versus non-prosecutorial 
alternatives like mato oput. Instead, Ongwen is before the ICC without the ICC 
or Uganda ever squarely addressing the controversial issue of whether/where he 
should be prosecuted. Similarly, Thomas Kwoyelo is on trial in Uganda for LRA 
crimes without any apparent reckoning with prosecution versus amnesty. 
A. Dominic Ongwen 
As noted above, Ongwen is one of two surviving LRA members wanted by 
the ICC. The original arrest warrant listed seven counts against Ongwen: three 
for crimes against humanity, and four for war crimes.90 After the confirmation of 
charges decision issued in March 2016, Ongwen faces trial on seventy counts, 
again based on crimes against humanity and war crimes.91 The new charges 
include sexual/gender based crimes as well as conscription/use of child soldiers. 
Trial is scheduled for December 6, 2016.92 
Ongwen was turned over to the ICC under unclear circumstances. Some 
sources indicate he turned himself over to US forces in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), who seem to have maintained custody.93 In this recounting of 
events, Ugandan authorities were involved immediately to confirm Ongwen’s 
identity, but indicated that US forces were holding Ongwen.94 Several days later, 
Ongwen was flown to The Hague for ICC prosecution.95 
Other sources state that after Ongwen left an LRA camp, he was found 
wandering near the CAR border by cattle herders, who took him to local forces; 
 
88. Aislinn Laing, A Lord’s Resistance Army Commander Goes on Trial but Joseph Kony Still Eludes 
Justice, TIME (Jan. 21, 2016), available at http://time.com/4186861/lra-kony-ongwen/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
89. Dominic Ongwen, captured LRA commander, will face murder charges in Hague, CBCNEWS (Jan. 
20, 2015), available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/dominic-ongwen-captured-lra-commander-will-face-
murder-charges-in-hague-1.2921159 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
90. Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders, Case No. ICC-CPI-20051014-110 (Oct. 14, 
2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=warrant+of+arrest+unsealed+against+five+lra+ commanders 
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the local militia commander then arranged to turn him over to US Special Forces, 
which in turn handed him over to the Ugandan army.96 
In its press release on January 20, 2015, the ICC thanked the United Nations 
for its role in enabling the transfer, along with the CAR, Uganda, US, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the African Union (AU) for their cooperation in the 
transfer.97 The US State Department press release “welcome[d] the transfer of 
Dominic Ongwen by Central African authorities” to the ICC, based on “close 
cooperation and consultation by the governments” of the CAR and Uganda, 
along with the AU and the ICC.98 
Given these differing accounts, it is not clear that Uganda ever had full 
custody over Ongwen, though it was certainly involved. According to the 
Ugandan Attorney General at the time, Ongwen was in the custody of “the 
Ugandan Contingent of the African Union Anti-Lord’s Resistance Army Task 
Force,”99 leaving it unclear whether this meant a transfer to Ugandan state 
custody. Regardless, Uganda did not formally assert jurisdiction over Ongwen or 
seek to prosecute Ongwen before its own courts or via traditional justice like 
mato oput. 
Uganda does have a mechanism that seems designed to address this situation. 
Uganda created a domestic court, now called the International Crimes Division of 
the High Court or ICD, as envisioned in the draft peace agreement.100 It has 
jurisdiction over international crimes, including genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, terrorism, human trafficking, and piracy.101 According to the 
Ugandan Judiciary website, the ICD was intended to be part of a peace deal with 
the LRA but has “come to be viewed as a court of ‘complementarity’ with 
respect to the [ICC], thus fulfilling the principle of complementarity [in the 
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Rome Statute].”102 It does not, however, incorporate traditional justice as 
envisioned in the Juba accords.103 
The ICD would seem the obvious option for Ongwen’s domestic prosecution. 
Although Uganda indicated the ICD is a way to implement the principle of 
complementarity and therefore block ICC prosecution, it may be that domestic 
prosecution posed complications that the Ugandan government preferred to 
avoid. In additional to jurisdictional issues, other complications include 
Ongwen’s status as a former abductee of the LRA and Ugandan amnesty laws. 
According to then-Attorney General, the Honorable Peter Nyombi, 
prosecution before the ICD was not an option.104 The Statement by the 
Government on the Dominic Ongwen Case under Attorney General Nyombi’s 
name noted that “the cross-border commission of the offenses committed by 
Dominic Ongwen and the fact that Uganda had already referred the situation 
concerning the LRA to the ICC requires that he be tried by the ICC, rather than 
the [International Crimes Division of the] High Court.”105 This statement has 
broad implications, as it would seem to apply equally to Joseph Kony. It implies 
that Uganda would turn Kony over to the ICC if he were to surrender or be 
captured, which contradicts the implications in President Museveni’s prior 
comments that a peace deal with Kony would include Ugandan accountability 
measures, not ICC prosecution.106 
Further, the statement noted the many actors involved (CAR, US, AU, and 
the Ugandan military) and indicated that their cooperative effort to turn Ongwen 
over to the ICC provided “international clout that requires the perpetrator be tried 
by the ICC, in which all the actors would have confidence.”107 In addition, the 
decision to send Ongwen to the ICC was endorsed by all the countries in which 
Ongwen’s operations had taken place as well as by the AU and US.108 The 
Attorney General also noted that any amnesty under Ugandan law would not 
block his prosecution at the ICC.109 Thus, the Ugandan government considered 
the ICC the proper venue. 
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Another jurisdictional issue may be that the ICC arrest warrant focused on 
crimes during 2004.110 According to Dixon Odur, Archdiocese of Gulu, Justice 
and Peace Commission, the ICD may not be able to address all crimes before 
2008.111 
One commentator asserts another motivation for the Ugandan government’s 
position that Ongwen must be prosecuted by the ICC: to ensure the ICC will not 
prosecute government officials for atrocities committed by the government 
during the conflict with the LRA.112 President Museveni stated Ongwen had to be 
sent to the ICC because he was not captured in Uganda, but according to Mark 
Kersten, in reality, Ongwen would have been prosecuted in Uganda if that were 
what Museveni wanted.113 Kersten asserted: “In shipping Ongwen to the ICC, 
however, Museveni deftly outsourced a potential political problem while, at the 
same time, ensuring that the ICC would continue to be dependent on his 
cooperation and that, in all likelihood, the government would not be targeted with 
prosecution.”114 
According to one source, Uganda initially wanted to prosecute Ongwen itself 
but “some feared that Ongwen’s ‘status as both victim and alleged author of war 
crimes’ could have resulted in . . . a pardon [under the 2000 Amnesty law].”115 
These two concerns will be addressed separately: (1) Ongwen’s abduction into 
the LRA, and its connection to calls for alternatives to prosecution; and (2) the 
potential application of the Amnesty Act, which will be explored in detail in the 
case of Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo.116 
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Ongwen’s status as victim and victimizer may have encouraged Uganda to 
pass off a controversial prosecution to the ICC.117 Ongwen was kidnapped as a 
child, though the exact age is disputed.118 Ongwen’s defense argued that, as an 
abducted child soldier, Ongwen should not be deemed responsible and/or that he 
acted under duress.119 In confirming charges, the ICC gave short shrift to 
Ongwen’s abduction into the LRA, leading to criticism of the ICC rather than 
Uganda.120 
Moreover, some community members in Uganda argue that Ongwen’s status 
as a former abductee should protect him from prosecution and punishment.121 
Whether the community supports prosecution or alternative justice mechanisms 
is a difficult question to answer.122 After the peace talks failed and a renewed 
military push led the LRA to flee Northern Uganda, more people were able to 
return home; as a result, support for offering the LRA non-prosecutorial 
alternatives decreased.123 When the LRA poses a less immediate threat, there is 
less opposition to domestic or international prosecution.124 
Nonetheless, some in Northern Uganda argue that Ongwen should be 
allowed to return home and undergo traditional justice. A prominent Ugandan 
organization, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, opposes ICC 
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prosecution, arguing for the use of mato oput.125 It contends that mato oput would 
foster restorative justice.126 Its position is influenced by Ongwen’s abduction, 
citing the failure to protect Ongwen from abduction and the need to recognize 
former child soldiers as among the most victimized of the conflict.127 
The desire for non-prosecutorial alternatives like mato oput is also motivated 
by a desire to see other child soldiers return home, something that might be 
discouraged by Ongwen’s prosecution.128 In fact, the Prosecutor of the ICC 
issued a statement trying to fight this perception.129 She stressed that LRA 
members other than Kony and Ongwen are not under arrest warrant at the ICC. 
Additionally, she rebutted rumors that LRA members who return home will be 
subject to prosecution, torture, or killing by the ICC.130 
Some note that singling out Ongwen when other former child soldiers have 
been given amnesty is not fair.131 In particular, more prominent leaders of the 
LRA have been given amnesty, making Ongwen—an abducted child—especially 
undeserving of prosecution.132 One commentator cites a radio station survey and 
Refugee Law Project survey indicating “many people already think that Ongwen 
should be pardoned because he was a child at the time of his abduction.”133 
Many in Northern Uganda are still waiting for their children to return from 
being abducted into the LRA.134 Others realize their own returned children are 
still trying to cope with the crimes that they were coerced into committing while 
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with the LRA.135 Furthermore, the prosecution of a former abducted child may 
“morally absolve the government for its failure to protect them.”136 
This is not to say that opinion is uniform. To the contrary, one survey 
respondent stated that in Acholi society, even young children know killing is 
wrong.137 Others noted that Ongwen should be prosecuted because he failed to 
take advantage of amnesty, but rather stayed and continued to commit crimes138 
when he could have escaped.139 Many civil society respondents supported ICC 
prosecution for Ongwen.140 The Ugandan Attorney General asserted that 
traditional justice mechanisms like mato oput can be used by LRA members who 
surrender, but not if they are LRA leaders or under arrest warrant by the ICC.141 
The varied opinions over whether Ongwen should be prosecuted at the ICC, 
or at all, echo the concerns over prosecuting Kony to some extent. Bringing us 
back to the peace versus justice debate, there is a concern that Ongwen’s 
prosecution will prevent fighters from laying down their arms, parallel to fears 
that threatening to prosecute Kony kept him from a peace deal. The same 
controversy over what constitutes justice resurfaces: retributive justice focused 
on prosecution of Ongwen, or restorative justice featuring non-prosecutorial 
mechanisms like matu oput. 
It is possible that Uganda’s action (or inaction) leading to Ongwen’s ICC 
prosecution could be seen as a principled choice, based on the legitimacy of the 
ICC, the unclear support for non-prosecutorial alternatives, and a justifiable 
reliance on prosecution in terms of advancing the goals of international justice. 
But the motivations of the Ugandan government have been called into question 
by some, leading to speculation that the failure to request a deferral in this case is 
not grounded in a judgment that prosecution at the ICC will most effectively 
achieve international justice or accountability. Rather, there are suspicions that 
the true rationale is based on a cost-benefit analysis focused on the government 
rather than the victims. To wit, that the Ugandan government would rather let the 
ICC tackle the controversial issue of how much to take into account the prior 
victim status of a former child soldier once he becomes an adult; and/or that the 
Ugandan government is manipulating the ICC into a position where state 
cooperation is necessary such that it will not pursue any investigations into 
culpability of governmental forces or officials. Avoiding the prosecution of 
Ongwen in the ICD also avoids another tangled web of issues illustrated by the 
Kwoyelo case. 
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B. Thomas Kwoyelo 
Some of those who support ICC prosecution do so because they fear that if 
Ongwen returned to Uganda, he would be entitled to amnesty. Amnesty has been 
given to a number of other LRA members, including more high-ranking leaders, 
who are now living freely in Uganda.142 Even President Museveni himself 
apparently indicated shortly after the collapse of Juba that “LRA leaders who had 
indicated a willingness to surrender, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo, 
could be eligible for amnesty.”143 
Uganda has repeatedly renewed a broad amnesty law. It provides amnesty to 
Ugandans who have engaged in acts of war or armed rebellion against the 
government of Uganda since January, 1986.144 More than 27,000 Ugandans have 
received amnesty since 2000.145 The act has been extended and appears to be 
currently in force.146 Amnesty is supported by many Northern Ugandans who 
want their abducted family members to come home without facing prosecution 
for crimes they may have been coerced or brainwashed into committing.147 
The amnesty issue has become quite complicated. One captured alleged LRA 
leader not wanted by the ICC, Thomas Kwoyelo, sought amnesty in January, 
2010.148 Kwoyelo attests that he was abducted by the LRA in 1987 at age 13. He 
was captured by Ugandan forces in 2008.149 Given the language of the Amnesty 
Act and prior practice, Kwoyelo’s amnesty could have been granted as a matter 
of course. But the government (specifically, the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions, or DPP) effectively rejected his request. Kwoyelo was initially 
charged with 12 counts under the Geneva Conventions Act, but the indictment 
was later amended at the ICD to “53 counts of war crimes under the Geneva 
Conventions Act, with alternative charges including murder, kidnapping with 
intent to murder, attempted murder and robbery under the Penal Code Act Cap 
120.”150 
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This seems in direct conflict with the routine application of the Amnesty Act, 
as Kwoyelo was not excluded.151 In fact, on September 22, 2011, the Ugandan 
Constitutional Court initially ruled for Kwoyelo when he challenged the failure 
to award him amnesty.152 The Constitutional Court found a violation of equal 
treatment under the Amnesty Act.153 The Constitutional Court rejected the DPP’s 
argument that the Amnesty Act is unconstitutional.154 It noted that the DPP could 
still prosecute persons declared ineligible for amnesty under a 2006 amendment 
to the act.155 
The Ugandan Supreme Court, however, recently harmonized the Amnesty 
Act with the prosecution of Kwoyelo.156 Rejecting the claim that the Amnesty 
Act was unconstitutional, it found that the act was proper but that amnesty could 
be withheld from those who committed certain crimes.157 Specifically, the act 
covers only crimes committed in support of rebellion, which the Supreme Court 
determined excluded not only personal crimes, but also crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, such as attacks 
against civilians.158 The Supreme Court also found that the Amnesty Act does not 
violate Uganda’s duties under international law.159 
The Supreme Court specifically referred to the Juba agreements, noting “both 
the Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army fully understood that there 
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would be accountability by certain individuals who may have committed certain 
criminal acts.”160 Although the final agreement was not signed by Kony, the 
Supreme Court looked to it as evidence of the intentions of the parties; in 
particular, for the principle that “individuals should take personal responsibility 
for grave breaches of the law” while being given due process of law.161 As a 
result, “none of the parties envisaged that [the Amnesty Act] granted amnesty for 
grave crimes. . . . The International Crimes Division of the High Court seems to 
have been created as a consequence of this.”162 
The Supreme Court rejected Kwoyelo’s argument that he was treated 
unfairly because other LRA commanders had been given amnesty.163 It noted 
Kwoyelo did not assert that he and other LRA commanders had committed 
similar crimes; the Supreme Court further assumed that the DPP must have 
determined in those cases that amnesty did apply.164 It also noted that Kwoyelo 
did not show that he had been discriminated against in any way.165 
The Supreme Court also addressed the peace versus justice debate.166 It noted 
that impunity would not bring peace, but rather those who committed 
international crimes must first be prosecuted, while “reconciliation and pardon 
mechanisms” may be put in place after trial.167 The Supreme Court stated that a 
peace deal between the LRA and the government “would illustrate the desire to 
have peace based on granting amnesty for war or rebellion, while at the same 
time demanding accountability by individuals for grave crimes committed 
against the population.”168 Echoing the words of former ICC Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo,169 the Court stated, “Peace based on impunity by people who 
may wish to hold the rest of society hostage and blackmail cannot be the peace 
envisaged in the Constitution.”170 
Kwoyelo’s trial was supposed to start on May 3, 2016, but has been 
repeatedly pushed back.171 In August, the court adjourned a pre-trial hearing until 
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September 21, 2016 because of issues with the disclosure of evidence and notice 
of the hearing to Kwoyelo’s attorneys. 172 In September, Kwoyelo’s lawyers 
challenged the judge presiding over the pre-trial on the ground that the judge is 
not part of the ICD of the High Court.173 After the judge refused to recuse herself 
because High Court judges have jurisdiction on all cases, the defense indicated it 
would appeal.174 Even if this matter is resolved expeditiously, other pre-trial 
issues may remain. 
The delays have raised questions about the fairness of the trial. According to 
the Ugandan Supreme Court, Kwoyelo was captured in 2005 and sought amnesty 
in 2010.175 He has remained in custody even though, based on the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling for amnesty, he should have been released during 2011-2015.176 
There are reports that Kwoyelo’s appeal for his release was postponed to July 18, 
2016 due to a lack of funds to hold the hearing.177 Kwoyelo has also raised 
concerns about lack of resources for his defense team.178 
According to commentary by the International Justice Monitor, there are 
other concerns regarding Uganda’s ability to carry out the trial.179 The new Rules 
of Procedure have been passed and are being used, although they are not formally 
in force.180 The ICD has only ad hoc procedures and limited funds for outreach 
and witness relations; the Registrar of the ICD indicated that the delay in the trial 
 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR (July 22, 2016), available at http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/07/kwoyelo-
trial-postponed-again-in-ugandan-court-causes-and-ramifications/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (delay to August). 
172. Lino Owor Ogora, New Lawyers Appointed as Kwoyelo Pre-Trial Hearing is Adjourned to 
September, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/08/new-
lawyers-appointed-as-kwoyelo-pre-trial-hearing-is-adjourned-to-september/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
173. Julius Ocungi, Kwoyelo’s lawyers question legality of presiding judge, MONITOR (UGANDA) 2016 
WLNR 28825684 (Sept. 22, 2016). 
174. Id. 
175. Uganda v. Kwoyelo (Constitutional Appeal No. 01 of 2012) [2015] UGSC 5 (8 April 2015), supra 
note 156, at 2. Other sources indicate Kwoyelo was captured in 2008. See, e.g., Mark Schenkel, International 
Crimes at Home, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/02/10/ 
international-crimes-home (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (article originally published 
in the journal Good Governance Africa). 
176. Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Uganda: Kwoyelo in the Dock, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (Apr. 
15, 2016), available at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/kwoyelo-in-the-dock-better-justice-delayed-than-no-
justice-at-all (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Reta E. Raymond, When Two 
Elephants Fight, It Is the Grass That Suffers: Proposed Amnesty Legislation for Peace and Justice, 40 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L & COM. 407, 419 (2013) (discussing fair trail concerns given Kwoyelo’s length in 
detention, lack of access to counsel/funding and translation). 
177. Ex-LRA’s commander Kwoyelo trial flops in Gulu, NEW VISION (May 4, 2016), http://www. 
newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1423810/-lras-commander-kwoyelo-trial-flops-gulu (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
178. Maunganidze, supra note 176. 
179. Nakandha, supra note 171; see also Moffett, supra note 151, at 518–19 (discussing draft rules of 
ICD). 
180. Nakandha, supra note 171. 
2017 / Recent Events in Uganda and the International Criminal Court 
286 
is “because the court is still struggling to mobilize funding to carry out outreach 
with victim communities prior to restarting the trial.”181 Due to a lack of 
resources, the ICD is seeking interns and volunteers for critical functions related 
to victims, witnesses, and outreach.182 Although the Registrar has indicated the 
prosecution should seek witness protection measures from the government, it 
appears that a formal witness protection program is not yet in place.183 Other 
resource issues include infrastructure.184 Kwoyelo’s initial appearance was 
overcrowded, leading the ICD to seek ICC help in televising future 
proceedings.185 This request seems beyond the scope of ICC assistance in 
general, all the more so given that Kwoyelo has never even been under arrest 
warrant by the ICC. 
The Kwoyelo case is also being watched closely to determine whether it 
discourages other LRA fighters from returning.186 It is not clear if the prosecution 
of Kwoyelo is the start of a trend or an aberration. The case of Caesar Acellam is 
often contrasted with Kwoyelo.187 According to some reports, when Acellam was 
captured in 2012, the DPP brought charges against him and an arrest warrant was 
issued; but the Ugandan army reportedly did not turn over Acellam, who was 
providing information on the LRA to the forces in Northern Uganda.188 It appears 
that Acellam was granted amnesty in 2015.189 
It is possible that the more recent Supreme Court decision will clear the way 
for more prosecutions in the future. Prior to the decision, the head of Uganda’s 
Amnesty Commission indicated his belief that there was no choice but to grant 
amnesty to those who seek it.190 The Supreme Court decision may have made 
clear that amnesty can be withheld if the DPP presses charges before the ICD. 
The difficulties seen in Kwoyelo’s trial to date, however, may discourage further 
prosecutions. At the time of this writing, the ICD trial had yet to commence. 
There does not seem to be a coherent or well-developed strategy for choosing 
between prosecution, whether ICC or state, and amnesty. In discussing 
Kwoyelo’s prosecution, for example, Sarah Nouwen argues that there was no 
clear policy regarding the application of the Amnesty Act to Kwoyelo.191 Rather, 
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the motivation seemed to be tied to the fact that the ICC Review Conference was 
soon to be held in Uganda. According to one prosecutor: “‘The ICC Review 
Conference put Uganda in the spotlight; then it is not good to grant an 
amnesty.’”192 Even the arguments before the Constitutional Court to strike down 
the Amnesty Act as unconstitutional were apparently not part of an official 
strategy, as the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General apparently did 
not approve the argument in advance.193 In sum, “[t]he prosecution of Kwoyelo 
was prompted by opportunism rather than law or policy.”194 The desire to “make 
an example of Kwoyelo” to show the ICD was taking action may have abated 
now that the ICD’s caseload includes active terrorism cases.195 
The most significant remaining question is what impact the prosecution of 
Kwoyelo might have on Kony. It seems likely it will further discourage Kony 
from entering into any peace deal that involves his surrender. Kony was 
unwilling to sign the peace deal when its language was ambiguous as to whether 
he would face state prosecution or alternative justice mechanisms like mato 
oput.196 Subsequent practice and case law indicate that it is improbable that Kony 
would receive amnesty for all his crimes. More likely, Kony would be prosecuted 
before the ICD if he were not turned over to the ICC. Given the political 
considerations and resource issues, it seems more likely the Ugandan government 
would outsource the prosecution to the ICC, thereby saving it the costs and likely 
ensuring the culpability of government actors would not be addressed by the 
ICC. All of this seems to be a moot point, however, as Kony’s actions since the 
peace negotiations do not indicate any genuine interest in a peace process with 
Uganda. Skepticism was warranted in 2008.197 It is even more plausible now, 
given Kony’s resumption of atrocities, albeit with a depleted force.198 
Although it “may seem that little was lost” when it comes to Kony, the 
impacts of Uganda’s approach may nonetheless undermine broader transitional 
justice for Uganda.199 The Ugandan government has apparently not made 
significant progress in implementing other types of restorative justice 
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mechanisms.200 According to one commentator, the Ugandan government is not 
interested in truth-telling, for fear of its own members being accused and for fear 
of costly reparations.201 Sarah Nouwen indicates that the cabinet did not allow 
transitional justice instruments to be implemented even though they had been 
part of the Juba accords.202 Nouwen contends that aspects of the peace deal “that 
involved burdens on the state and were unlikely to be funded by donors, for 
instance reparations, were ignored.”203 She concludes: “When other options, such 
as militarily defeating the LRA, providing an amnesty or handing over the LRA 
leadership to the ICC promise to be more convenient, the [Ugandan government] 
is likely simply to discard its newfound commitment to domestic legal 
accountability and leave lawyers without a role to play.”204 
Victims remain uninformed and hold possibly false expectations, such as 
believing that ICC prosecution of Ongwen will yield significant reparations.205 
While reparations may be possible through the Trust Fund for Victims in the 
event Ongwen is convicted, it seems unlikely they will receive significant 
compensation given the number of victims and inadequacy of the resources.206 
This could turn victims against the ICC, possibly leading to greater support by 
victims of Ugandan traditional justice mechanisms. On the other hand, although 
the Ugandan government has launched some aid programs in the North, to date 
the government has not offered the anticipated comprehensive reparations 
program.207 Moreover, recent work by Luke Moffett indicates that in addition to 
reparations, victims seek punishment of those most responsible from the LRA 
and Ugandan military.208 Finally, the position of Ugandan victims and the 
government may shift if the LRA resumes significant activity in Northern 
Uganda. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Ongwen and Kwoyelo cases could have presented opportunities for 
Uganda and the international community to grapple with serious questions raised 
by different theoretical approaches to peace and justice. Yet, neither seems to 
have yielded a well thought-out approach or strategy. It remains to be seen 
whether future opportunities will present themselves, and, if so, whether the 
Ugandan government and international community are able to take advantage of 
them to advance peace with justice. 
 
